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1.  GENERAL COMMENTS 
 
In his stimulating book Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, Ethan Mills 
constructs a tradition of philosophical skepticism in Indian philosophy that cuts 
across the now-standard classification of views as orthodox vs. heterodox and, among 
the orthodox, as belonging to one of 6 darshanas. Insofar as he groups the Buddhist 
Nagarjuna, the Charvakin Jayarashi, and the Advaitin Shri Harsha together as 
skeptics, Mills is following in the footsteps of Matilal’s (1986, 28) grouping of these 
three figures as “skeptical dialecticians who argued that the very concept of 
knowledge was either paradoxical or circular”. However, in arguing that these 
philosophers were skeptics about philosophy Mills hopes to show that they share a 
good deal more with skeptics in other traditions, like Sextus Empiricus in Greek 
philosophy and Zhuangzi in Chinese philosophy, than they do with contemporary 
epistemological skepticism, which he associates with Descartes and DeRose.   
  To begin, I’d like to get clear on the phenomenon, skepticism about philosophy or 
philosophical skepticism, which Mills distinguishes from epistemological skepticism.  
A chart will be useful here: 
 
Epistemological Skepticism Skepticism about Philosophy 
(a) a theoretical position  (a*) a way of life [without beliefs], which 
results in some valued end-state,  
(b) claims to state truths about knowledge 
[which ought to be believed] 
(b*) aims at suspending belief; (also c*, 
d*) argues against dogmatic philosophers 
using the dogmatists’ own views, and 
avoids adopting any views  
c) on the basis of arguments that generate 
an active mental state of doubt; 
 
________________________ 
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d) arguments have the form:  in order for 
a subject to know some fact, some further 
epistemic condition must be met, but 
since that condition isn’t met, the subject 
does not know the first fact 
including (b*, d*) views about criteria 
for knowing 
 
Mills says that epistemological skepticism is (a) a theoretical position that (b) claims 
to state truths about knowledge [which presumably ought to be believed] (c) on the 
basis of arguments that generate an active mental state of doubt; (d) the arguments 
have the form:  in order for a subject to know some fact (e.g. that there is a fire in 
front of him), some further epistemic condition must be met (e.g. he must know he’s 
not dreaming), but since that condition isn’t met (he doesn’t know he’s not 
dreaming), the subject does not have knowledge of the first fact (that there is a fire in 
front of him) (Mills 2018, xxiii-xxiv; my enumeration differs from Mills’ in order to 
make referring to the points I focus on in my comments easier, but I think the 
substance is the same). By contrast, skepticism about philosophy aims at (b*) 
suspending belief, and (or perhaps as a result) advocates (a*) a skeptical way of life 
[without beliefs], which results in some valued end-state (e.g. freedom from 
disturbance in Sextus, nirvana in Nagarjuna, enjoyment in Jayarashi). Further, 
philosophical skeptics argue against dogmatic philosophers (b*, c*, d*) using the 
dogmatists’ own views, and scrupulously avoid adopting any views themselves, 
including (b*, d*) views about the criteria for knowing (xxiv-xxvii). In the 
introduction Mills says his conception of skepticism about philosophy aims at “a 
cultural expansion of the idea of skepticism...[and] a return to something much closer 
to the original, Hellenistic understanding” (xxv), and in the conclusion he speculates 
as to what features of thought make it the case that philosophical skepticism crops up 
in so many different times and places. 
  This is heady stuff. But in the dreary role of critic, I would like to urge some 
caution in the characterization of and contrast between these kinds of skepticism.  
First, the contrast between modern skepticism’s focus on knowledge and 
Pyrrhonism’s focus on belief (b, b*) seems to me misleading.  Sextus is working with 
his dogmatic (standard Stoic) interlocutors’ conceptions of belief and knowledge:  
belief (doxa) is the result of an act of assent, and so is an occurrent judgment (which 
can become dispositional); among beliefs are special grasps (katalêpseis) that 
represent the object that caused them in such a way that they cannot be false; grasps 
correspond to and are the ancestors of Descartes’ clear and distinct perceptions, 
which are pieces of propositional knowledge. The Stoics reserve the term 
‘knowledge’ (epistêmê, technê) for a system of special grasps that have been made 
stable by their interconnections. It’s only because what the Stoics call knowledge 
doesn’t take individual propositions as its object that when Sextus gives particular 
arguments against particular views, he can only target what the Stoics call a belief or 
the special species of belief, grasp. But in ordinary language his target would be 
expressed as a bare assertion, e.g., ‘The earth is the center of the cosmos’ or a 
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knowledge-claim, ‘I know that the earth is the center of the cosmos.’ In this case, 
targeting belief rather than knowledge is a matter of nomenclature, not substance.  
Perhaps Mills has in mind that Sextus’ reason for targeting these dogmatic mental 
states is that they are a cause of disturbance rather than only that they may be false, 
but then the contrast between focusing on knowledge vs. belief isn’t itself an 
illuminating one. 
  Furthermore, does Sextus really target all beliefs for suspension? He says the 
Skeptic suspends belief about non-evident things, or, equivalently, does not form 
dogmatic beliefs, but does assent to the feelings which are the necessary results of 
sense-impressions (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.13-14), and “non-dogmatically” accepts 
“the guidance of nature, the constraint of the passions, the tradition of laws and 
customs, and the instruction of the arts”, “seeing that we cannot remain wholly 
inactive.” (23-24, translations of Sextus, here and below, are mine). When we flesh 
out the Skeptic way of life, Pyrrhonian skepticism may turn out to be a theoretical 
position after all (a), if it only suspends belief about the class of beliefs that are ‘about 
the non-evident’. 
  Second, because philosophy, even dogmatic philosophy, is critical, we need to 
have a way to distinguish critical from skeptical positions: Parmenides argues that the 
world delivered to us through sense-perception and opinion is impossible; Plato 
criticizes the senses as giving us an inaccurate account of what the world is like. But 
because these criticisms are the basis for their arguments about what reality must be 
like, it would not be right to call them skeptics about philosophy (nor should we say 
that they are methodological skeptics like Descartes because their criticism is 
restricted to one means of knowledge). Similarly, I need more argument than Mills 
provides that it is “articulation…of Upanishadic mystical skepticism” or a claim that 
“knowledge of the atman is not gained through philosophical conceptualization…” 
(8) when Yajnavalkya says to Maitreyi that [knowing?] the self “is like this. When a 
drum is being beaten, you cannot catch the external sounds; you catch them only by 
getting hold of the drum or the man beating the drum.” (Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 
2.4.7, tr. Olivelle). Why skepticism or rejection of philosophical conceptualization 
rather than, for example, an argument by analogy that the self must be grasped 
indirectly?  Clarity, and consistency with Mills’ initial characterization of skepticism, 
would recommend reserving the label ‘skepticism’ for global pessimism about our 
epistemic condition, and ‘skepticism about philosophy’ for a global pessimism about 
philosophical methods in particular, whatever those turn out to be. 
  Third, while I don’t doubt that similar philosophical questions, answers, and 
skeptical responses may be found in different traditions, it seems to me not at all 
straightforward to locate counterparts in particular texts. So for example, Mills finds 
Meno’s paradox of inquiry (“if one doesn’t know what virtue is, how will one 
recognize it when one finds it”, 10-11) in Kena Upanishad 2.2 on knowing brahman: 
   
  I do not think/that I know it well; 
  But I know not/that I do not know. 
Who of us knows that,/he does know that; 
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But he knows not,/that he does not know (tr. Olivelle). 
 
Although these dense verses can be interpreted in multiple ways, I cannot find in 
them anything about the problem of recognizing the answer to your question when 
you’ve got it. The KeU passage seems to me to say that even the one who is 
appropriately cautious not to overstate the extent of his knowledge (“I do not think 
that I know it well”) doesn’t know that he doesn’t know (no [na vedeti] veda cha), or 
doesn’t know what he doesn’t know, or knows something and doesn’t know 
something else of it. In the lines just before the quoted ones, the KeU considers a 
distinct problem also raised by Plato, that of double ignorance: when you are 
ignorant, you often don’t even know that you don’t know (Plato, Apology 21b-22e, 
Laws 863c). But if we want to pursue Meno’s paradox as a consequence for inquiry 
of not knowing not only that we don’t know whether we don’t know what there is to 
know, but also that since we don’t know something, we don’t thereby know what it is 
that we don’t know and can’t inquire, then we should remember that Meno’s paradox 
asks not only the question Mills picks up, of how, in the absence of knowledge, you 
can recognize the answer to your question when you have found it, but also the 
question he inexplicably leaves out, of how your inquiry can be directed in the 
absence of any knowledge (Plato, Meno 80d-e).1  
  But my comments will be very dreary indeed if they all take this form. So instead, 
I would now like to explore some issues around (b*, c*, and d*), namely, the 
suspension of belief and argumentation solely on the basis of the dogmatists’ own 
views, focusing on Mills’ treatment of Nagarjuna, and introducing Sextus as a 
comparandum. For the time being, I’ll accept Mills’ overall interpretation of 
Nagarjuna as arguing against the views of other philosophers while not asserting any 
thesis himself, and as aiming by these arguments at the cessation of conceptualization 
and thereby attaining a liberatory end-state. Sextus also argues ‘non-dogmatically’ 
against the views of other philosophers, reports that as a result he is brought to 
suspend belief, whereupon a good end-state, freedom from disturbance, follows. I’ll 
then compare and contrast (1) the two philosophers’ practice of negative argument 
and (2) the epistemic attitudes of suspension of belief and cessation of conceptual 
proliferation.  
  According to Mills, early Buddhism had two strands: a practice of analysis 
leading to insight, and quietism. Quietism adumbrates (1) the Buddha’s anti-
speculative attitude, for example, when he refuses to answer metaphysical questions 
on the grounds that his teachings are for the sake of ending suffering, like a raft for 
crossing over, not retaining (14-15 on Majhima Nikaya 1.426-32, 130-42); (2) the 
Buddha’s recommendation to eliminate conceptual proliferation (papañca) in order to 
rid oneself of attachment (16, on MN 1.110, cf. 17-18 for abandonment of views, 
which seems like the same thing and is also described in terms of cessation of 
                                                
1 Carpenter and Ganeri 2010 describe the paradox as concerning ‘the opacity of ignorance’, and trace 
its treatment in a number of figures, including Shabara, Shankara and Sriharsha, with the last of these 
figures treating it as a problem of aiming at an unknown. 
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conceptualization); (3) the non-dogmatic conclusions of his negative arguments 
against the self, such as the argument showing that the self, which is permanent and 
exercises control, is not identical with the body, perception, consciousness, etc., the 
result of which is disillusionment with these, which eliminates lust (16-17, on 
Samyukta Nikaya 3.68). Mills makes the elegant proposal that Nagarjuna develops a 
two-phase philosophy integrating analysis-to-insight and quietism, the first phase 
giving anti-realist arguments for emptiness, and the second phase showing that the 
thesis of emptiness is self-undermining, for if there is nothing for views to be about, 
we should stop conceptualization. (Mills 2018, 35-41) 
  I have two worries about Mills’ general interpretation. First, Mills considers the 
charge that it is logically inconsistent to make the claim that one is making no claim, 
and answers it, following Thorsrud’s (2009) defense of Pyrrhonism, that insofar as 
skepticism is a practice or way of life, “the charge of inconsistency is a category 
mistake: ‘Just as it is neither consistent nor inconsistent to ride a bicycle, the practice 
of skepticism, in so far as it is something the sceptic does, can be neither consistent 
nor inconsistent’ ” (Mills 2018, 36).  But it’s not because riding a bicycle is a practice 
that consistency and inconsistency are irrelevant to riding a bicycle; it’s because the 
practice doesn’t involve any actions that are evaluable for consistency or 
inconsistency. (Imagine if your student in Introduction to Philosophy said to you, 
‘Yes, I did say that there is no God, and that there is a God, but studying philosophy 
is my way of life, so it’s a category mistake to accuse me of inconsistency!’) Insofar 
as the practice of skepticism involves making claims (according to Mills in 
Nagarjuna’s phase 1, and then in phase 2 about phase 1), and claims are evaluable for 
consistency or inconsistency, the skeptic is also evaluable for consistency or 
inconsistency. It’s no good for the skeptic to say that she isn’t making claims at all, 
since the force of her anti-dogmatic arguments depends on her making some claims, 
even if they are only conditional ones.   
  Second, Mills considers the objection that Nagarjuna couldn’t be a Buddhist if he 
is a skeptic and answers by appeal (again) to Thorsrud on Sextus, that “for 
Pyrrhonians religion is a kind of behavior rather than a kind of belief” (Mills 2018, 
41), and that Sextus says that “Pyrrhonians can engage in religious rituals and be 
pious toward the gods without having any religious beliefs”.  For the record, what 
Sextus actually reports is that Skeptics “say undogmatically that there are gods and 
revere gods and say that they exercise providence” (Outlines 3.3, my tr.). This is not a 
matter of ritual rather than belief, but (again) of nondogmatic belief or assertion (on 
which see more below). But further, suppose that it’s true that in Greek religion piety 
is a matter of ritual rather than belief; why should the same hold in an intellectual 
tradition like Buddhism with its emphasis on right view and teaching? This is not to 
say that Nagarjuna can’t be a Skeptic, but it is to say that if he is a Skeptic there’s 
some tension between that and his Buddhism. 
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2. PRESUPPOSITIONLESS ARGUMENTS 
 
I’ll now turn to a couple of Nagarjuna’s arguments in greater detail. In 
Vigrahavyavartani (VV) 30-51 Nagarjuna is replying to an objector who, after 
attacking (and here I’ll just quote Mills) “the coherence of [the] concept of emptiness 
(sunyata)”, argues, “if the means of knowledge (pramanas) are empty of essence, 
they cannot yield knowledge; thus Nagarjuna cannot give an epistemologically sound 
reason to believe that all things lack essences” (Mills 2018, 53). According to Mills, 
Nagarjuna’s reply “denies that he is trying to apprehend anything through perception, 
inference, or any other means of knowledge, and thus the Nyaya objection is off base, 
since the opponent is accusing him of not being able to do something he was never 
trying to do in the first place” and then “launches into a critique of the means of 
knowledge”, concluding with “a rejection of the five options for establishing the 
pramanas” (Mills 2018, 54). 
  Mills describes Nagarjuna’s reply as a five-fold prasanga argument. In making a 
prasanga argument, one simply draws out consequences of the opponent’s view that 
the opponent would find unwelcome, without committing oneself to either the view 
or the consequences. Readers of ancient Greek philosophy will recognize this as 
similar to one kind of elenctic argument Plato has Socrates make in his dialogues, 
e.g., if the interlocutor says, ‘Justice is truth-telling and returning what you owe’, the 
philosopher might reply, ‘So on your account, it’s just to return a weapon you’ve 
borrowed from a friend when he’s gone mad?’. Although much of Mills’ brief 
discussion is taken up with establishing the superiority of his own skeptical 
interpretation of VV over Westerhoff’s ‘contextualist’ interpretation, according to 
which Nagarjuna is developing “an epistemology that incorporates empty epistemic 
instruments” (Westerhoff 2010, 55-56), I would like to focus on how the prasanga 
arguments themselves are supposed to work.2   
  To get a taste for these arguments, let’s consider two: 
 
(1) Against the view that the pramanas need to be established by other pramanas, 
Nagarjuna argues: an infinite regress follows (VV 31-32). 
(2) Against the view that the pramanas are self-establishing, like fire, which is 
self-illuminating, Nagarjuna argues:  
(a) since to illuminate is to light up something that was previously in the dark, 
fire does not illuminate itself (34); if fire were self-illuminating it would 
also be self-consuming [rather than fuel-consuming] (35); if fire 
illuminated itself then its opposite, darkness, would obscure itself (36); 
since to illuminate is to destroy darkness, there will have to be darkness in 
the fire for it to illuminate itself (37); the arising fire does not connect with 
darkness [because it excludes it] (38); if fire could drive out darkness 
                                                
2  Because Mills is very quick with the VV arguments themselves, I provide my own detailed 
reconstruction below where needed. 
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without connecting with it, then fire here could drive out darkness 
everywhere (39)3 
(b) if the pramanas were self-establishing, they would not be means of 
knowing anything [but it’s necessary, if something is to be a means of 
knowledge, that it actually result in an episode of knowing, prama] (40-
41) 
  . . . 
 
In VV 51, Nagarjuna summarizes the conclusions of his prasanga arguments:  The 
means of knowledge are not (1) self-established, nor (2) mutually established, nor (3) 
established by other means of knowledge, nor (4) established by the objects of 
knowledge, nor (5) established without reason. 
  Mills says that the conclusion of a prasanga argument is the denial of the view 
whose unwelcome consequences have been drawn out, which does not, however, 
imply any alternative view. Such a denial is an “illocutionary negation”, or 
“commitmentless denial” of the opponent’s thesis (Mills 2018, 52).  He explains, 
using “the stock example”:  whereas ‘This is a non-Brahmin’ (paryudasa negation) 
implies the existence of a person belonging to some other class, ‘It is not the case that 
this is a Brahmin’ (prasajya negation) doesn’t entail the existence of a person at all. 
  But illocutionary negation and commitmentless denial seem to me to be different 
analyses, with different implications. Matilal, the source of the illocutionary 
interpretation of prasajya negation, illustrates it with Sanjaya’s “I do not say that 
there is an afterlife”, where ‘I do not say’ negates an assertion (viz. there is an 
afterlife), but without committing Sanjaya to asserting that there is no afterlife.  
(Matilal 1986, 88-89).  From someone’s saying ‘I do not say P’, it can’t be inferred 
what he does say about P. 
   ‘I do not say this is a Brahmin’ would be illocutionary negation. But a sentence 
that begins ‘It is not the case that’ seems to be (qua illocution) an assertive, and the 
assertion ‘It is not the case that this is a Brahmin’ does seem to take on some 
commitments from the assertion that it negates, viz., that there exists some ‘this’, 
which is not a Brahmin.  True, ‘this’ could refer to a statue, or a tree, or some vaguely 
designated region of space, but refer it must.  In the literature on presuppositions, 
‘this’ is a presupposition-trigger.4   
  Westerhoff (cited in Mills’ notes), who distinguishes the kinds of negations in 
terms of their different presuppositions, says that the distinction is originally 
grammatical.  In prasajya negation it is the verb that is negated: brahmana nasti; in 
                                                
3 I take it these arguments aren’t just about fire, but about self-illumination or self-certification, where 
the basic notion involves a change from one state to its contrary, from dark to light or ignorance to 
awareness. According to these arguments, the reflexive ‘self-‘ ‘’is incompatible with that change of 
state. The arguments seem to have the same structure as Aristotle’s argument against self-motion in 
Physics 8. 
4 Beaver and Geurts 2014 
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paryudasa negation, it is the noun: abrahmana asti. 5   But unfortunately for 
philosophers, there is no natural language in which presupposition-preserving and 
presupposition-cancelling negations are realized by different lexical items.  Indeed, 
the diagnosis of what is presupposed by a sentence is often made on the basis of 
whether it is projected when embedded in the negation of the sentence; for example, 
‘The present king of France is bald’ is thought to presuppose that there is a present 
king of France, in part because it is also presupposed in, ‘The present king of France 
isn’t bald’ or ‘It isn’t the case that the present king of France is bald’. Now 
Westerhoff represents the paryudasa negation ‘The present king of France is not 
bald’ as ∃x (Kx & -Bx), and contrasts it with the prasajya negation ‘It is not the case 
that the present king of France is bald’ which he represents as -∃x (Kx & Bx).  The 
latter, but not the former, allows that there is no present king of France.  But 
entailment and presupposition are not the same.6 It’s possible that Nagarjuna and his 
opponent7 are thinking of commitments as entailments rather than presuppositions, 
and this would be interesting. But if they are thinking of presuppositions, the question 
I want to raise is:  how can Nagarjuna determine that none his negations will inherit 
any presuppositions from the sentences he negates?8 
  I can think of two ways:  one is for him to say explicitly: ‘I cancel all 
presuppositions of my utterances’, but I’m not sure he could keep arguing after this, 
given how much we presuppose in communicating (the same goes for negating by 
saying ‘No!’ or ‘You’re wrong!’: the only way to continue arguing after this depends 
on presuppositions about what has been negated). A possibly more constructive, 
because more specific, alternative suggested by Sextus attempts to cancel the 
presupposition that his sentences make assertions about a mind-independent reality by 
explaining that they are really reports. 9  For to distinguish Skepticism from a 
superficially similar negative dogmatism, according to which the truth is 
inapprehensible (Outlines 1.3), Sextus says, “we do not positively affirm that the fact 
is exactly as we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears 
                                                
5 Westerhoff 2007 thinks that the distinction between choice and exclusion negation, where choice 
negation assumes that the object falls under a property or its opposite, and exclusion doesn’t, is not 
quite the same distinction, because the prasajya-paryudasa distinction isn’t ever connected to 
categories, but allows that the choice-exclusion contrast might be one kind of prasajya-paryudasa 
distinction; perhaps the illocutionary-propositional distinction is another kind. 
6 As Beaver and Geurts 2014 point out, “It’s the knave that stole the tarts” presupposes a salient and 
identifiable knave and entails that the knave did something illegal. “It isn’t the knave that stole the 
tarts” still presupposes the salient and identifiable knave but does not entail that the knave did anything 
illegal.  
7 As Westerhoff 2007 explains (b), in Nyaya the negation, ‘X is not Y’ is analyzed as ‘X is not 
combined with Y’, where absence of Y is a property attributed to X. For such a negation to be sensical, 
there must be an X, and a Y (so that ‘X’ and ‘Y’ refer), and for the negation to be true, existing X and 
existing Y aren’t combined.  This is on the assumption that terms either denote something existing or 
are nonsensical. The only way for a cognition to be false is for it to miscombine terms for existing 
things in a way they are not combined in reality. 
8 Galloway 1989 says that prasajya negation is more radical in Madhyamaka than the realists, not just 
predicate-negation or complement negation but term negation. 
9 Sextus’ move does seem to be illocutionary negation—noted by Matilal 1992, 7.  
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to us at the moment” (1.4). In other words, he is denying that the illocutionary force 
of his statements is affirmation or denial about how things really are apart from how 
they appear, and telling us that his statements are instead reports of how things appear 
to him, like the statement, ‘I’m cold’. 
  Sextus devotes several sections of Outlines (1.187-209) to how skeptical 
expressions should be understood: 
 
‘No more this than that’ is said by the skeptic to mean ‘I know not which of these I ought 
to assent to’ (a report) or ‘why/for what reason this rather than that?’ (a question) (1.188-
91); 
‘Non-assertion’ is neither affirming nor denying anything about anything non-apparent 
(1.192-93); 
‘I determine nothing’ means ‘I am now in such a state of mind as neither to affirm 
dogmatically nor to deny any of the matters now in question (1.197); 
‘All things are non-apprehensible’ means ‘All the non-apparent matters of dogmatic 
inquiry which I have investigated appear to me non-apprehensible’ (1.200). 
 
But does Sextus’ strategy for cancelling presuppositions by stipulating their 
illocutionary force work? Maintaining that one’s assertions are always reports of how 
things seem to one, never dogmatic pronouncements about how things are apart from 
how they seem to one, may seem to be as much of a cheat as stipulating that one’s 
negations don’t inherit any presuppositions from the statements they negate. Myles 
Burnyeat has argued that Sextus’ distinction between belief and appearance, or 
assertion and report, is in some cases merely verbal and that some of his so-called 
reports are really beliefs by another name. 10 I can sensibly suspend the belief that it’s 
cold today on the grounds that while I feel cold, it may not actually be cold (perhaps I 
have a fever). But can I suspend the belief that 700+200=900, while reporting that it 
seems to me on the basis of addition that 700+200=900? What else is believing that 
700+200=900 if not having it appear to one on the basis of addition that it is? But if 
what it is for me to believe that the statement p is true or to assent to p is that it appear 
to me that p on the basis of reasoning about p, then it looks like even though he says 
he is merely reporting, Sextus is actually stating a belief when he says, “To every 
dogmatic claim I have examined there appears to me to be opposed a rival dogmatic 
claim which is equally worthy and equally unworthy of belief” (Outlines 1.203).   
  In the above, I have tried to identify and evaluate the strategies by which 
Nagarjuna and Sextus might try to argue against dogmatists without having any views 
of their own. I turn now to the attitudes they recommend taking towards views. 
 
3.  PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SUSPENSION OF BELIEF VS. CESSATION OF 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
Sextus concludes his long discussion of the criterion, the analogue to the means of 
knowledge, “the criterion of truth has appeared to be unattainable” (Outlines 2. 95). 
                                                
10 Burnyeat 1980. 
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But Sextus rejects ‘nothing is true’ as a self-refuting view. (91) Instead, the upshot of 
his arguments is that he is not (yet) in a position to form a judgment/belief about the 
criterion (whether it exists, what, if it exists, it is, etc.), and so must suspend belief 
about it. What kind of ‘must’ is this? If psychological, then the mechanism of belief 
formation is such that you’ll only assent to P if the evidence for P is stronger than the 
evidence for -P. Since the Skeptic’s ability consists in opposing evidence of equal 
strength on both sides of an issue, he can’t form a belief and must suspend. If ‘must’ 
is rational, i.e., if skepticism is a rational practice, he’ll decide to suspend judgment 
because the warrant for P and -P are equal. Indeed, Sextus characterizes the skeptic as 
one who continues investigating (zêtousi [1.4], skepsesthai [1.7]), which indicates that 
he is open to the possibility that there is a criterion of truth, and in general, about each 
thing he discusses, a mind-independent reality to be discovered.   
  The comparison with Sextus raises the question: Why is the effect of Nagarjuna’s 
prasanga arguments not to leave the philosopher in aporia, admitting that she doesn’t 
know how the means of knowledge are established, and as a result whether they can 
be established? In the circumstances, she might even wonder if she knows what a 
means of knowledge is.  Still, wouldn’t this be a reason to try to find out? If she has 
no idea about how to find out, mightn’t she ask around, try out different accounts of 
means of knowledge (rather than examining just the different candidates of 
perception, inference, testimony)? Isn’t cessation of conceptualization a rash response 
to the arguments, insofar as the arguments don’t obviously identify conceptualization, 
rather than ignorance, as the problem? Or perhaps what’s rash is the prior conclusion 
that the means of knowledge are empty, or lack svabhava, which is what prompts the 
discussion of the VV. In either case, compared with suspension of belief, emptiness or 
cessation of conceptualization seems to me a dogmatic response, insofar as they put 
an end to inquiry and not only dogma. On the other hand, the fact that Sextus does not 
think to impugn our concepts despite having collected so many conflicting 
conceptions from the dogmatists, of e.g. cause, body, time, etc., raises interesting 
questions about a road not taken. Instead of concluding, ‘we cannot determine, 
concerning cause, whether it exists or does not exist’, it seems an oversight not to 
wonder: ‘how could anything answer to those specifications?’     
  In any event, the difference between suspension of belief and cessation of 
conceptualization suggests that Sextus is not among the philosophers who “use 
philosophical arguments to cure their readers of the desire to do philosophy” (62). 
Insofar as Sextus is offering a cure, it is for dogmatism, but dogmatism is attachment 
to a view, not the desire to do philosophy. One might, however, question whether 
Sextan investigation is really investigative, a genuine search for truth, or whether, 
contrary to his self-presentation, its search for evidence on either side of a question 
isn’t in fact for the sake of producing suspension. 
  Perhaps Nagarjuna’s ‘cease conceptualization’ is not supposed to follow, either 
psychologically or rationally, from prasanga arguments, in the way that suspension 
of belief is supposed to be a consequence of equipollent arguments; perhaps it is just 
supposed to be a practical recommendation, so that even if conceptualization hasn’t 
been established as the problem, cessation of conceptualization is a cure. In this 
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respect it would reflect the quietist strain of early Buddhism in which Mills finds its 
origin. 
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